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        <title>Employment Law Spotlight</title>
        <link>https://www.employmentlawspotlight.com</link>
        <description>Providing Developments &amp; Insight on Trending Topics in Employment Law</description>
        <lastBuildDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 13:42:54 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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            <title>Employment Law Spotlight</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Is Anyone Actually Reading This? New State Rules for AI in Employment Decisions]]></title>
            <link>https://www.employmentlawspotlight.com/blogs/is-anyone-actually-reading-this-new-state-rules-for-ai-in-employment-decisions/</link>
            <guid>https://www.employmentlawspotlight.com/?p=14206</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 13:42:53 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[<p>Somewhere today, Copilot is drafting an email that Copilot will later summarize – efficient, if a little uneventful. For ordinary office correspondence, that may be the point. For decisions affecting someone’s employment, however, several states are less willing to leave the human role quite so undefined.</p>
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>Somewhere today, Copilot is drafting an email that Copilot will later summarize – efficient, if a little uneventful. For ordinary office correspondence, that may be the point. For decisions affecting someone’s employment, however, several states are less willing to leave the human role quite so undefined.</p>



<p>Colorado’s first artificial intelligence (AI) law (<a href="https://leg.colorado.gov/bills/sb24-205" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">SB 24-205</a>) emphasized risk-management programs addressing algorithmic discrimination. Delayed and replaced before taking effect, it was followed by laws focusing more directly on how employers use AI, what they must disclose and how employment decisions can be reviewed.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Limits on Automated Discipline and Termination</h2>



<p>California’s <a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260SB947" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">No Robo Bosses Act (SB 947)</a>, effective July 1, 2027, restricts reliance on automated systems in discipline and termination decisions. It prohibits sole reliance and, where an employer primarily relies on an automated system, requires a person to corroborate its output against other evidence, such as personnel records or performance data. The employer must also provide the affected employee written notice after the decision. Although the meaning of “primarily relies” remains undefined, the law makes clear that discipline and termination decisions require meaningful human involvement when automated systems are used in the decision-making process.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">New Rights to Explanation and Human Review</h2>



<p>Colorado’s <a href="https://leg.colorado.gov/bills/sb26-189" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">SB 26-189</a>, effective Jan. 1, 2027, addresses what happens after certain adverse AI-assisted employment decisions, such as rejecting an applicant or offering lower compensation. The law requires a plain-language explanation, within 30 days, of the technology’s influence. Affected individuals may also seek correction of inaccurate personal data and meaningful human review and reconsideration when they are commercially reasonable.</p>



<p>The scope of Colorado’s requirements remains unsettled. At an Oct. 26, 2026 <a href="https://tsscolorado.com/business-financial-groups-fear-unintended-consequences-of-proposed-ai-rules/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">hearing on the attorney general’s proposed implementing rules</a>, business groups argued that the proposed definition of “material influence” could trigger notice and human-review requirements even when AI contributes to an outcome ultimately reached by a person. The Colorado Chamber of Commerce also warned that requiring notice and review for large numbers of unsuccessful job applicants could create significant burdens, particularly in high-volume hiring. Consumer advocates, meanwhile, argued that the proposed rules could unduly limit when human review is available. Separately, in <em>X.AI LLC v. Weiser</em>, <a href="https://www.law360.com/articles/2470483/colo-ag-agrees-to-pause-enforcement-of-landmark-ai-law" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">the attorney general agreed to defer enforcement</a> until 14 days after a ruling on a preliminary-injunction motion following final rules. These developments warrant monitoring as rulemaking and litigation proceed.</p>



<p>Regulations under the <a href="https://cppa.ca.gov/regulations/pdf/ccpa_updates_cyber_risk_admt_appr_text.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA)</a>, beginning Jan. 1, 2027, provide related rights for certain significant employment decisions, including rights to opt out of qualifying automated decision-making and to obtain information about how the technology was used in the decision; for some decisions, a business may offer a human appeal in place of the opt-out.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Human Involvement Does Not Eliminate Discrimination Risk</h2>



<p>The same states imposing new requirements on AI-assisted employment decisions also continue to regulate discriminatory employment practices under existing law. Since Oct. 1, 2026, <a href="https://www.cga.ct.gov/2026/ACT/PA/PDF/2026PA-00015-R00SB-00005-PA.PDF" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Connecticut has expressly provided that using automated employment technology is not a defense to a discrimination complaint</a>. California’s <a href="https://calcivilrights.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/32/2025/06/Final-Text-regulations-automated-employment-decision-systems.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Fair Employment and Housing Act regulations</a> address discriminatory automated decision-making, including the relevance of anti-bias testing and when vendors may act as an employer’s agent, while <a href="https://www.ilga.gov/Legislation/publicacts/view/103-0804" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Illinois prohibits employers from using AI in ways that discriminate against protected classes</a>.</p>



<p>Federal law provides another layer of protection. Although the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s <a href="https://www.eeoc.gov/sites/default/files/2026-06/NEP_-_signed.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">June 4, 2026 enforcement plan</a> disavows disparate-impact litigation, Title VII’s disparate-impact provision remains intact and private claims continue. In <a href="https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/USCOURTS-cand-3_23-cv-00770" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener"><em>Mobley v. Workday, Inc.</em></a>, for example, an applicant alleges discrimination involving an AI screening system, and the case against the screening vendor remains pending.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">New Disclosure Requirements for AI Use and Workforce Reductions</h2>



<p>States are also requiring employers to disclose AI’s role in employment decisions. As we discussed in June, <a href="https://www.bakerlaw.com/insights/illinois-proposes-specific-notice-requirements-for-employers-who-use-ai-in-hiring-and-employment-decisions/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Illinois requires employers to notify affected employees and applicants of covered AI use</a>, although proposed regulations specifying the notice requirements were later withdrawn. The <a href="https://cppa.ca.gov/regulations/pdf/ccpa_updates_cyber_risk_admt_appr_text.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">CCPA regulations similarly require pre-use notice</a> for covered automated decision-making, while Colorado’s <a href="https://leg.colorado.gov/bills/sb26-189" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">SB 26-189</a> requires notice when individuals interact with covered automated decision-making technology. Beginning Oct. 1, 2027, <a href="https://www.cga.ct.gov/2026/ACT/PA/PDF/2026PA-00015-R00SB-00005-PA.PDF" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Connecticut will require written notice</a> identifying the AI tool, its purpose, the personal data used and a contact for inquiries.</p>



<p>Disclosure requirements also extend to automation-related layoffs. <a href="https://www.cga.ct.gov/2026/ACT/PA/PDF/2026PA-00015-R00SB-00005-PA.PDF" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Connecticut requires employers filing notices under the federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act with its labor department to disclose whether the layoffs are related to AI or another technological change</a>. Starting Jan. 1, 2027, California’s <a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260SB951" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">SB 951</a> will require qualifying Cal/WARN notices for workforce reductions caused in whole or in substantial part by AI or other automated technology to identify the affected occupations, automated job functions and technology involved.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Bottom Line</h2>



<p>AI can help employers evaluate information and recommend outcomes. But these state laws increasingly ask whether consequential decisions can be explained, reviewed and supported by evidence beyond an automated output. Employers should assess where AI influences employment decisions, who reviews those outputs, and what notices or records may be required. As AI becomes a more ordinary part of work, the human role in decisions about people may matter more, not less.</p>



<p>Please contact the authors of this blog or your BakerHostetler attorney contact if you have any questions.</p>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Ashtar R. Abboud, Jeffrey R. Vlasek]]></dc:creator>
            <category>Employment</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Eleventh Circuit Rules No Exhaustion Required for ERISA Statutory Claims]]></title>
            <link>https://www.employmentlawspotlight.com/blogs/eleventh-circuit-rules-no-exhaustion-required-for-erisa-statutory-claims/</link>
            <guid>https://www.employmentlawspotlight.com/?p=14170</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 04 Nov 2026 15:14:39 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[<p>Earlier this month the full U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in <em>Bolton v. Inland Fresh Seafood Corp. of Am., Inc.</em>, No. 24-10084, 2026 WL 3056461 (11th Cir. Oct. 13, 2026), repealed the administrative remedies exhaustion requirement for Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) statutory claims set forth in <em>Mason v. Cont’l Grp., Inc.</em>, 763 F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1985).</p>
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>Earlier this month the full U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in <em>Bolton v. Inland Fresh Seafood Corp. of Am., Inc.</em>,No. 24-10084, 2026 WL 3056461 (11th Cir. Oct. 13, 2026), repealed the administrative remedies exhaustion requirement for Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) statutory claims set forth in <em>Mason v. Cont’l Grp., Inc.</em>, 763 F.2d 1219 (11th Cir. 1985).</p>



<p>The administrative remedies exhaustion requirement refers generally to the processes set forth by the terms of a benefit plan that a potential claimant must first follow to seek review of their claim prior to filing suit in federal court under ERISA. The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is to prevent a court from prematurely interfering with the plan’s decision-making process – allowing plan administrators the chance to correct errors, apply consistent interpretation of the terms of the plan, apply the expertise and discretion they have in managing plan assets, avoid excessive judicial intervention, and assemble a full factual record in the event court intervention is required. <em>See</em> <em>Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co</em>., 40 F.3d 426, 432 (D.C. Cir. 1994).</p>



<p>Though ERISA (as well as subsequent Department of Labor regulations) requires plans to provide a process for participants to obtain a full and fair review of the plan’s decision adjudicating their claim, ERISA does not explicitly require claimants to exhaust a plan’s internal administrative remedies. Instead, this requirement has been applied as a matter of judicial discretion.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What the 11th Circuit Held in ‘Bolton’</h2>



<p>In <em>Bolton,</em> a group of seafood workers appealed a ruling from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia dismissing their proposed class action alleging mismanagement of an employee stock ownership plan. The workers alleged violations of 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(2) and 1132(a)(3), claiming that defendants breached their fiduciary duties by causing the plan and participants to overpay for common stock and that the plan’s trustee failed to conduct proper diligence before settling on the purchase price. The District Court ultimately dismissed the workers’ claims, reasoning that <em>Mason</em> required administrative exhaustion for these ERISA statutory claims.</p>



<p>On review, the Eleventh Circuit, en banc, expressly overruled <em>Mason</em> and the rule requiring administrative exhaustion for ERISA statutory claims as an “atextual product of judicial creation based solely on policy reasons.” <em>Bolton</em>, 2026 WL 3056461 at *4. Aside from its doctrinal reasoning, the Eleventh Circuit noted that removing its administrative exhaustion requirement for ERISA statutory claims would conform with seven other circuits – the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth and D.C. <em>Id.</em> at *7. The only remaining outlier circuit would be the Seventh, whose exhaustion rule for ERISA statutory claims is not mandatory. <em>Id.</em> at *9 (citing <em>Lindemann v. Mobil Oil Corp</em>., 79 F.3d 647, 650 (7th Cir. 1996)).  </p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Distinction Between Statutory and Denial-of-Benefits Claims</h2>



<p>The Eleventh Circuit was careful to note in its opinion that its holding was limited to whether ERISA requires administrative exhaustion for <em>statutory</em> claims. The Eleventh Circuit explicitly stated that it did not address cases requiring exhaustion where a plaintiff is challenging the denial of benefits under the terms of a plan governed by ERISA. <em>Bolton</em>, 2026 WL 3056461 at *5, n.1.</p>



<p>The courts recognize a distinction between ERISA statutory claims and claims for the wrongful denial of benefits, particularly where administrative exhaustion is required. While the Eleventh Circuit joins the vast majority of circuits in dropping the administrative exhaustion requirement for ERISA statutory claims, there is uniformity among the circuits that a potential claimant must exhaust administrative remedies when claiming the wrongful denial of plan benefits under ERISA, with limited exceptions.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What To Expect Moving Forward – More Attempts To Recast Claims as Those for Denial of Benefits</h2>



<p>Without the ability to seek dismissal of ERISA statutory claims for the failure to exhaust administrative remedies in the Eleventh Circuit, employer-side attorneys may find it advantageous to consider whether a plaintiff’s statutory claims are really disguised denial-of-benefits claims (or otherwise duplicative of the denial-of-benefits claims a plaintiff might already be alleging). <em>See Rochow v. Life Insurance Co. of North America</em>,780 F.3d 364, 372 (6th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (holding plaintiff’s claim for benefits under § 1132(a)(1)(B) prevented plaintiff from also recovering for breach of fiduciary duty related to denial of benefits under § 1132(a)(3), and clarifying that a breach of fiduciary duty claim would only be appropriate where it is based on an injury separate and distinct from the denial of benefits); <em>see also Diamond v. Local 807 Labor Mgmt. Pension Fund</em>, 595 F. App’x 22, 25 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2806 (2015) (upholding the dismissal of an alleged breach of fiduciary duty claim because, as alleged, the claim required interpretation of plan documents despite “framing the claim as a statutory violation”). If the argument can be made that proposed statutory claims are, at their essence, claims for benefits, then they should go through the administrative claim process under the applicable plan in accordance with existing case law. Plaintiff-side attorneys, by contrast, may be able to point to the opinion in <em>Bolton</em> to further the argument that the text is on their side, and may seek to revive arguments that ERISA contains no affirmative requirement to exhaust administrative remedies for denial-of-benefits claims and, therefore, that courts should dispense with that judicial invention. Given the long-standing and widely accepted precedent applying the exhaustion requirement to denial-of-benefits cases, it would be an uphill battle.</p>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matthew F. Somogye, Jeffrey R. Vlasek]]></dc:creator>
            <category>ERISA</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[New Year, New Obligations: Philadelphia Adds New Protected Categories for 2027]]></title>
            <link>https://www.employmentlawspotlight.com/blogs/new-year-new-obligations-philadelphia-adds-new-protected-categories-for-2027/</link>
            <guid>https://www.employmentlawspotlight.com/?p=14141</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 28 Oct 2026 12:07:48 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[<p>Philadelphia employers will soon face another expansion of their workplace obligations under the city’s Fair Practices Ordinance. Last year, Philadelphia Mayor Cherelle Parker signed Bill No. 250849, which adds express protections for menstruation, perimenopause and menopause to the Fair Practices Ordinance. The amendments, which will go into effect Jan. 1, 2027, prohibit actual or perceived discrimination based on these conditions and create new reasonable accommodation obligations for covered employers.</p>
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Key Takeaways</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Philadelphia has amended its Fair Practices Ordinance to expressly prohibit discrimination based on menstruation, perimenopause and menopause.</li>



<li>Employers will also be required to provide reasonable accommodations when symptoms associated with menstruation, perimenopause or menopause substantially interfere with an employee’s ability to perform one or more job functions.</li>



<li>The amendments will take effect Jan. 1, 2027, giving employers time to review existing discrimination and accommodation policies and practices.</li>
</ul>



<p>Philadelphia employers will soon face another expansion of their workplace obligations under the city’s Fair Practices Ordinance. Last year, Philadelphia Mayor Cherelle Parker signed <a href="https://admin.bakerlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Bill-250849-Phil.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Bill No. 250849</a>, which adds express protections for menstruation, perimenopause and menopause to the Fair Practices Ordinance. The amendments, which will go into effect Jan. 1, 2027, prohibit actual or perceived discrimination based on these conditions and create new reasonable accommodation obligations for covered employers.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">New Antidiscrimination Protections</h2>



<p>The Philadelphia Fair Practices Ordinance, which applies to employers with one or more employees working in Philadelphia, prohibits discrimination in employment on numerous grounds. The new bill amends the ordinance to prohibit discrimination on the basis of menstruation, perimenopause or menopause.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">New Accommodation Requirements</h2>



<p>Under the amended ordinance, employers will need to provide reasonable accommodations for menstruation, perimenopause or menopause when the associated symptoms “substantially interfere with an employee’s ability to perform one or more job functions,” provided that the employee requests such accommodations and the accommodations will not cause undue hardship to the employer.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Next Steps for Employers</h2>



<p>While the amendments do not take effect until Jan. 1, 2027, as we approach the end of this year Philadelphia employers can use the lead time to evaluate their existing policies and compliance practices. In particular, employers should consider reviewing and revising their employee handbooks generally, and their equal employment opportunities and reasonable accommodation policies in particular, to address the new protections. Employers should also consider training human resources professionals, managers and supervisors on how to identify accommodation requests and appropriately engage in the interactive process.</p>



<p>Employers with questions about the new amendments can contact the authors or the BakerHostetler Labor and Employment Practice Group for more information.</p>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Matthew C. Berger, Christian R. White]]></dc:creator>
            <category>Employment</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[San Francisco Expands Its Fair Chance Ordinance: What Employers Need To Know]]></title>
            <link>https://www.employmentlawspotlight.com/blogs/san-francisco-expands-its-fair-chance-ordinance-what-employers-need-to-know/</link>
            <guid>https://www.employmentlawspotlight.com/?p=13302</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 17 Aug 2026 16:52:07 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[<p>Background checks just became a little more complicated in San Francisco. Effective Aug. 10, amendments to the city’s Fair Chance Ordinance add new protections for certain out-of-state criminal records, establish additional response deadlines and increase the cost of noncompliance.</p>
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>Background checks just became a little more complicated in San Francisco. Effective Aug. 10, amendments to the city’s Fair Chance Ordinance add new protections for certain out-of-state criminal records, establish additional response deadlines and increase the cost of noncompliance.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Key Takeaways</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Covered employers and affordable housing providers may not consider or rely on certain out-of-state arrests or convictions involving conduct that is lawful in California.</li>



<li>Employers should update background-screening procedures, notices, templates and decision-making processes.</li>



<li>The amendments add deadlines to the adverse-action process and double administrative penalties for violations.</li>
</ul>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Four Newly Protected Categories</h2>



<p>The amended ordinance bars covered employers and affordable housing providers from considering or relying on out-of-state arrests or convictions arising from conduct that is lawful in California and relates to:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Abortion-related healthcare</li>



<li>Drag performances</li>



<li>Gender-affirming care</li>



<li>Spontaneous abortion</li>
</ul>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">The Updated Adverse-Action Process</h2>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Step 1: Send the Pre-Adverse Action Notice</h3>



<p>If an employer intends to take adverse action based on an applicant’s or employee’s conviction history, it must provide a copy of the background check report.</p>



<p>The individual then has seven days to submit evidence that the information is inaccurate, evidence of rehabilitation or other mitigating information. If the individual responds within that period, the employer must:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Confirm receipt of the information in writing within 14 days.</li>



<li>Delay the proposed adverse action for a <em>reasonable period</em> after confirming receipt.</li>



<li>Reconsider the proposed action in light of the information provided.</li>
</ul>



<p>If the applicant or employee makes a reasonable factual showing that the proposed action is based solely on a conviction that is not directly related to the position, the employer must withdraw the proposed adverse action.</p>



<h3 class="wp-block-heading">Step 2: Communicate the Final Decision</h3>



<p>If the employer ultimately takes adverse action based on conviction history, it must notify the applicant or employee of the final decision.</p>



<p>The final notice must be sent within 30 days after the employer receives the individual’s response. If the individual does not respond, the employer must send the notice within 30 days after the pre-adverse action letter.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Penalties: Twice the Price of Getting It Wrong</h2>



<p>The amendments double the administrative penalties for noncompliance:</p>



<p><strong>First</strong><strong> violation:</strong> $1,000, up from $500</p>



<p><strong>Second</strong><strong> violation:</strong> $2,000, up from $1,000</p>



<p><strong>Each</strong><strong> subsequent violation:</strong> $4,000, up from $2,000</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">What Employers Should Do Now</h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>Confirm whether the ordinance covers your workforce, including positions involving at least eight hours of work per week in San Francisco.</li>



<li>Review background check criteria to ensure protected out-of-state records are excluded from consideration.</li>



<li>Update job postings, pre-adverse action letters, final notices and internal checklists.</li>



<li>Build the seven-, 14- and 30-day deadlines into the hiring process.</li>



<li>Train recruiters, human resources personnel, hiring managers and third-party screening vendors on the new rules.</li>
</ul>



<p><strong>The bottom line:</strong> A background check should inform a hiring decision, not create a compliance problem. Our Labor and Employment Practice Group can help employers review their screening practices, revise forms and policies, and navigate the updated adverse-action process.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Todd H. Lebowitz, Ava Claypool]]></dc:creator>
            <category>Background Checks</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[NLRB General Counsel Advises That Employer’s Noncompete and Confidentiality Agreement is Not an Unfair Labor Practice]]></title>
            <link>https://www.employmentlawspotlight.com/blogs/nlrb-general-counsel-advises-that-employers-noncompete-and-confidentiality-agreement-is-not-an-unfair-labor-practice/</link>
            <guid>https://www.employmentlawspotlight.com/?p=13090</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 13 Jul 2026 18:59:22 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[<p><strong>Key Takeaways</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>The National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB or Board) Division of Advice recently recommended that a Regional Office dismiss an unfair labor practice charge premised on the existence of employee noncompetes.</li>
<li>This recommendation of dismissal follows the NLRB’s current view on noncompetes and is a further rebuke of the NLRB’s interpretation of noncompetes under the prior General Counsel.</li>
<li>With the NLRB still on the sideline for noncompete regulation, the patchwork of state law obligations will continue to expand and dominate employers’ compliance requirements.</li>
</ul>
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>Key Takeaways</strong></h2>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li>The National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB or Board) Division of Advice recently recommended that a Regional Office dismiss an unfair labor practice charge premised on the existence of employee noncompetes.</li>



<li>This recommendation of dismissal follows the NLRB’s current view on noncompetes and is a further rebuke of the NLRB’s interpretation of noncompetes under the prior General Counsel.</li>



<li>With the NLRB still on the sideline for noncompete regulation, the patchwork of state law obligations will continue to expand and dominate employers’ compliance requirements.</li>
</ul>



<p>On June 26, the NLRB’s Division of Advice (Division) released a memorandum in <a href="https://apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45842ddb7b"><em>Biotricity, Inc.</em>, Case 08-CA-326334</a>, addressing whether an employer’s noncompete agreement violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (Act).</p>



<p>The Division held, in line with then-Acting <a href="https://www.bakerlaw.com/insights/trumps-valentine-to-employers-the-nlrbs-acting-general-counsel-undoes-his-predecessors-agenda/">General Counsel William B. Cowen’s Feb. 14, 2025 General Counsel Memorandum</a>, that “[u]nder current law, an employer does not violate the Act by maintaining non-compete provisions. . . . The General Counsel is of the view that non-compete agreements do not as a general matter impact employees’ rights under Section 7. Accordingly, the non-compete language within the Non-Compete Agreement does not violate Section 8(a)(1).”</p>



<p>The Division also found that the confidentiality obligation, although broad, was lawful. Specifically, the Division stated that claiming “all information not generally known to the public” is confidential is broad but that the enumerated examples, including “payroll information, . . . personnel information, [and] employee lists,” plus “dozens of other examples of purely business-related types of information” “clearly explains the Employer’s strong confidentiality interests in the highly competitive medical-technology industry.” The Division applied basic logic to conclude that “[v]iewed through this lens, employees would reasonably understand that the confidentiality provision restricts them from sharing confidential information with competitors, not Section 7-protected communications with fellow employees.”</p>



<p>Notably, the Division did not simply rubber-stamp Biotricity’s entire agreement. Rather, it found that certain unidentified “portions of the non-solicitation, inducement-of-third-parties, and non-disparagement clauses are arguably unlawful.” However, it found that those provisions were moot in the current case because the employer did not seek to enforce them, and thus the allegations related to them were “dismissed on noneffectuation grounds.”</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>The ‘Biotricity’Dispute</strong></h2>



<p><em>Biotricity</em> involved two former employees who signed six-month noncompete agreements restricting their ability to work for competitors and their use of confidential information, along with nonsolicitation and nondisparagement provisions.</p>



<p>After the employees joined a competitor, Biotricity sued to enforce the agreements, and the employees responded by filing unfair labor practice charges alleging the noncompete agreement violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>A Shift Away from Prior NLRB Guidance</strong><strong></strong></h2>



<p>During the Biden administration, NLRB General Counsel Jennifer Abruzzo took the position, reflected in <a href="https://nlrbresearch.com/pdfs/09031d4583a87168.pdf">GC 23-08</a>, that certain restrictive covenants and workplace agreements could unlawfully restrain employees’ Section 7 rights by discouraging protected activity, including seeking better working conditions, organizing or acting together with co-workers.</p>



<p>That position formally shifted on Feb. 14, 2025, when Cowen issued GC 25-05, which rescinded several of Abruzzo’s memoranda, including GC 23-08. The <em>Biotricity</em> Advice Memorandum reflects this change in interpretation.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading"><strong>What ‘Biotricity’ Means for Employers</strong></h2>



<p>The <em>Biotricity</em> memorandum, although not binding on the Board, is a further signal that the Board is moving away from the prior administration’s expansive view that noncompete obligations generally interfere with employees’ Section 7 rights. However, even if lawful under the Act, employers must still ensure that their noncompete, confidentiality, and other restrictive covenants comply with state law, which is quickly evolving into a further patchwork of disjointed and technical obligations across the country.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Daryl G. Leon, Mianda K. Bashala]]></dc:creator>
            <category>NLRB</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Illinois Proposes Specific Notice Requirements for Employers Who Use AI in Hiring and Employment Decisions]]></title>
            <link>https://www.employmentlawspotlight.com/blogs/illinois-proposes-specific-notice-requirements-for-employers-who-use-ai-in-hiring-and-employment-decisions/</link>
            <guid>https://www.employmentlawspotlight.com/?p=12037</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 04 Jun 2026 12:16:50 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[<p>On May 15, 2026, the Illinois Department of Human Rights (IDHR) <a href="https://dhr.illinois.gov/about-us/legislative-updates/artificial-intelligence-in-employment.html" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">introduced proposed</a> regulations that would specify how employers must give notice to workers when they use artificial intelligence (AI) in hiring or employment decisions.</p>
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p><strong>UPDATE</strong>: On June 2, 2026, the Illinois Department of Human Rights withdrew these proposed regulations and canceled the public hearing that had been scheduled for June 10. Given that the underlying statute requires only “notice” when using AI for covered purposes and does not elaborate on the frequency or manner of notice, employers will have to await further regulatory action for any additional guidance.</p>



<p><strong>ORIGINAL TEXT</strong>: On May 15, 2026, the Illinois Department of Human Rights (IDHR) <a href="https://dhr.illinois.gov/about-us/legislative-updates/artificial-intelligence-in-employment.html" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">introduced proposed</a> regulations that would specify how employers must give notice to workers when they use artificial intelligence (AI) in hiring or employment decisions.</p>



<p><a href="https://www.ilga.gov/Legislation/publicacts/view/103-0804" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Public Act 103-084</a>, which went into effect on Jan. 1, 2026, as part of the Illinois Human Rights Act (Act), requires employers to give notice to workers when using AI “with respect to recruitment, hiring, promotion, renewal of employment, selection for training or apprenticeship, discharge, discipline, tenure, or the terms, privileges, or conditions of employment.” It also establishes civil rights violations against employers whose use of AI in employment decisions “has the effect of subjecting employees to discrimination” based on protected class or ZIP code. However, the legislature delegated authority to the IDHR to promulgate regulations fleshing out the notice requirement. These newly proposed amendments broadly instruct when notice would be required and what information employers would need to include.</p>



<p>Using computer-based assessments for measuring a worker’s aptitude or personality, screening resumes, directing job advertisements to targeted groups, analyzing data received from third parties concerning prospective or current employees, and monitoring productivity are some examples outlined in the proposed regulations that would trigger required notice requirements.</p>



<p>For prospective hires, employers that use AI in covered employment decisions would need to provide notice of that in the job posting. For current employees, the employer would be required to provide notice of AI usage – on an annual basis and within 30 days of adopting any new AI solution – in the employee handbook, manual or policy document and at a “conspicuous location” both on the employer’s website and at a physical location where the organization’s notices are usually posted.</p>



<p>The notice would need to specify which AI system is being used, for which positions it is being used and which covered employment decisions the technology is influencing, such as hiring or discipline. The notice would also have to explain which personal data it is analyzing and why, such as summarizing resumes or evaluating video interviews. Employers would need to provide contact information for hiring managers or human resources specialists to or from whom workers could direct questions or request reasonable accommodations.</p>



<p>The notices would have to be written in plain language and be reasonably accessible to workers with disabilities. Employers would have to provide notice on an annual basis and within 30 days of implementing a new system.</p>



<p>In general, the proposed amendments would not require notice if the employer does not use AI to “make, influence or facilitate” a covered employment decision. For example, notice would not be necessary if an employer uses AI for other purposes, such as for designing a job posting or generating text or images for promotional material. Similarly, notice would not be triggered if an employer used an automated computer system, such as word processing software or web hosting, that does not constitute AI as defined in the Act.</p>



<p>Members of the public have 45 days to review and submit comments on the proposals. A public hearing is scheduled for June 10, 2026, which will be held virtually and in person. Written comments are due Monday, June 29, 2026.</p>



<p>It is important for Illinois employers to monitor the progress of these proposed regulations and to be ready to implement any changes to their current AI notices that may be needed once a final version is promulgated.</p>



<h2 class="wp-block-heading">Relevant links</h2>



<p>Announcement from Illinois Department of Human Rights: <a href="https://dhr.illinois.gov/about-us/legislative-updates/artificial-intelligence-in-employment.html" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://dhr.illinois.gov/about-us/legislative-updates/artificial-intelligence-in-employment.html</a></p>



<p>Public Act 103-0804: <a href="https://www.ilga.gov/Legislation/publicacts/view/103-0804" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://www.ilga.gov/Legislation/publicacts/view/103-0804</a> </p>



<p>Illinois Register: <a href="https://www.ilsos.gov/departments/index/register.html" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://www.ilsos.gov/departments/index/register.html</a></p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



<p><em>Summer Associate Stephanie Haines co-authored this blog post</em>.</p>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Bonnie Keane DelGobbo]]></dc:creator>
            <category>Employment</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Florida Clarifies the Statute of Limitations for Filing a Lawsuit Under the State Civil Rights Act]]></title>
            <link>https://www.employmentlawspotlight.com/blogs/florida-clarifies-the-statute-of-limitations-for-filing-a-lawsuit-under-the-state-civil-rights-act/</link>
            <guid>https://www.employmentlawspotlight.com/?p=12012</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 27 May 2026 12:29:54 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[<p>On May 22, 2026, Governor Ron DeSantis signed into law amendments to the Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA” or the “Act”) that, among other things, clarify when an aggrieved person must bring a lawsuit against an employer in cases where the Florida Commission on Human Relations (“FCHR” or the “Commission”) fails to make a timely determination as to whether there is reasonable cause to believe there has been discrimination.  The new law (HB 1407), which was passed unanimously by both houses of the Florida legislature, attempts to harmonize the FCRA’s statute of limitations with the realities of how charges of discrimination are filed with, and investigated by, state and federal civil rights agencies.</p>
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>On May 22, 2026, Governor Ron DeSantis signed into law amendments to the Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA” or the “Act”) that, among other things, clarify when an aggrieved person must bring a lawsuit against an employer in cases where the Florida Commission on Human Relations (“FCHR” or the “Commission”) fails to make a timely determination as to whether there is reasonable cause to believe there has been discrimination.  The new law (HB 1407), which was passed unanimously by both houses of the Florida legislature, attempts to harmonize the FCRA’s statute of limitations with the realities of how charges of discrimination are filed with, and investigated by, state and federal civil rights agencies.</p>



<p>The FCRA prohibits employment discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status. Generally speaking, a person claiming to have been discriminated against in violation of the Act must file an administrative complaint with the FCHR within 365 days of the alleged violation.  In lieu of filing a complaint with the FCHR, a charging party may “dual file” with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) or with any county, local, or municipal fair-employment-practices agency (“FEPA”), seeking relief under both federal and state or local anti-discrimination laws. The date the complaint is filed with the Commission for purposes of the FCRA is the earliest date of filing with the EEOC, the FEPA, or the FCHR itself.  Once the administrative complaint is filed, it will be investigated by one of the above-mentioned agencies pursuant to a work-sharing agreement between those agencies. </p>



<p>If within 180 days after the administrative complaint is filed, the FCHR determines that there is reasonable cause to believe that discrimination occurred, the “aggrieved person” has one year to file a lawsuit alleging the violation of the FCRA raised in the administrative complaint.  If the Commission finds that there is no reasonable cause, then the aggrieved person is limited to proceeding with an administrative hearing, which (unlike civil lawsuits) is non-jury and provides limited relief.  Lastly, when the Commission fails to make any determination within 180 days, the aggrieved person has one year to file a lawsuit from receipt of a notice from the FCHR stating that it had been unable to determine whether there was reasonable cause. </p>



<p>Confusion over the one-year statute of limitations in the case of reasonable cause determinations by the FCHR (or the Commission’s failure to timely reach such determinations) has plagued parties in situations where the Commission has not investigated the matter but instead deferred to the EEOC.  In Florida, the EEOC historically has not rendered reasonable cause determinations within 180 days (if at all).  Instead, it will typically issue a Notice of Right to Sue without a substantive determination as to the merits of its investigation (with the FCHR never touching the administrative complaint). Similarly, even when the FCHR has undertaken the responsibility to conduct the investigation, parties have complained that it has been tardy sending out notices of the expiration of the 180-day period.    </p>



<p>HB 1407 provides that when the FCHR determines there is reasonable cause to believe a discriminatory practiced occurred, or the EEOC issues a Notice of Right to Sue in connection with a dual-filed complaint alleging violations of both state and federal anti-discrimination laws, the aggrieved person may file a civil action with respect to the alleged FCRA violation no later than one year after <strong><em>the earlier</em></strong> of the: (a) date of the Commission’s determination of reasonable cause (as provided in the existing Act); or  (b) issuance of a Notice of Right to Sue by the EEOC.  If the FCHR does not make a reasonable cause determination or the EEOC does not issue a Notice of Right to Sue within 180 days after the administrative complaint’s filing, a lawsuit alleging an FCRA violation may be commenced no later than 18 months after the administrative complaint’s filing.  The law takes effect on July 1, 2026.<a href="#_ftn1" id="_ftnref1">[1]</a></p>



<p>Nothing in the Act impacts a party’s ability to bring a claim under federal anti-discrimination laws, which provide separate procedural requirements.  Clarification of when parties can bring lawsuits under the FCRA, however, is important to employees claiming discrimination, and the employers that must defend such claims.  For instance, because the FCRA provides for unlimited compensatory damages (versus capped damages under Title VII or the ADA, or no such damages under the ADEA), many plaintiff-side lawyers prefer to file lawsuits alleging violations of the FCRA in state court rather than federal lawsuits alleging violation of Title VII, the ADEA, or the ADA.  In addition, many plaintiff-side lawyers prefer the more informal, less labor-intensive litigation format in state court over the more formalistic, paper-driven method of litigation in federal courts. </p>



<p>BakerHostetler has a strong group of employment lawyers in Florida that litigate in federal and state court constantly.  Feel free to reach out to our Orlando-based Labor and Employment Team with any questions or concerns.</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



<p><a href="#_ftnref1" id="_ftn1">[1]</a> HB 1407 also eliminates the requirement that the FCHR send respondents copies of charges and the Commission’s determinations via registered mail.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Patrick M. Muldowney]]></dc:creator>
            <category>Employment</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[New FMCSA Final Rule Requiring Visas for CDL Credentials Impacts Non-Domiciled Truck Drivers and Their Employers Alike]]></title>
            <link>https://www.employmentlawspotlight.com/blogs/new-fmcsa-final-rule-requiring-visas-for-cdl-credentials-impacts-non-domiciled-truck-drivers-and-their-employers-alike/</link>
            <guid>https://www.employmentlawspotlight.com/?p=11741</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 30 Mar 2026 18:00:47 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[<p>On Feb. 23, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) and the Department of Transportation issued a final rule revising federal regulations for state driver’s license agencies responsible for issuing commercial driving credentials to foreign-domiciled individuals. The final rule, which took effect March 16, significantly restricts certain “non-domiciled” drivers from being able to hold or renew a commercial driver’s license (CDL) without an H-2A, H-2B or E-2 visa. Existing non-domiciled drivers who do not meet the final rule’s visa requirements may continue driving under their current CDL until it expires.</p>
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>On Feb. 23, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) and the Department of Transportation issued a final rule<a id="_ftnref1" href="#_ftn1">[1]</a> revising federal regulations for state driver’s license agencies responsible for issuing commercial driving credentials to foreign-domiciled individuals. The final rule, which took effect March 16, significantly restricts certain “non-domiciled” drivers from being able to hold or renew a commercial driver’s license (CDL) without an H-2A, H-2B or E-2 visa. Existing non-domiciled drivers who do not meet the final rule’s visa requirements may continue driving under their current CDL until it expires.</p>



<p>According to the final rule, titled “Restoring Integrity to the Issuance of Non-Domiciled Commercial Drivers Licenses (CDL),” the only non-domiciled drivers eligible to obtain or retain their CDL credentials will be those individuals with H-2A, H-2B or E-2 visas. All other non-domiciled CDL holders are no longer eligible for CDLs, including certain asylum seekers, refugees and individuals who participate in the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program. Approximately 200,000 truck drivers are expected to lose their CDLs as a result of the final rule, which affects drivers and employers alike across the country.</p>



<p>The final rule has the stated purpose of “rectify a critical gap in the Nation’s non-domiciled licensing system,” but its potential impact is currently the subject of litigation. On Feb. 26, the AFL-CIO, the American Federation of Teachers and two employee drivers with CDLs set to expire filed an emergency motion to stay the effective date of the FMCSA final rule pending review.<a href="#_ftn2" id="_ftnref2">[2]</a> The drivers and their unions argue that the final rule will cause them and several other drivers irreparable harm, as they face the loss of their jobs. On March 5, Waste Pro USA Inc., a Florida-based waste collection company that services approximately 2.1 million residential and commercial customers, filed an amicus brief in support of the motion to stay the final rule. Waste Pro argues that the final rule threatens essential sanitation services by reducing the CDL workforce and has already disrupted route-based services, which will only worsen absent relief.</p>



<p>The court has not yet ruled on the petition for an emergency stay, and state driver’s license agencies have implemented the final rule’s requirements in their review of CDL applications. For some businesses, the rule has already created a shrunken pool of eligible non-domiciled drivers. Transitioning to a visa-based vetting system will require businesses relying on CDL drivers to extensively review employee license records; plan for vacancies created by expired, non-renewable licenses; adjust recruiting strategies to target drivers with eligible immigration status under the final rule; and identify solutions for potential disruptions in route-based service plans.</p>



<p>For more information on the potential impacts of the FMCSA final rule, please contact Jeremy Hart (<a href="mailto:jhart@bakerlaw.com">jhart@bakerlaw.com</a>) or Lee Solomon (<a href="mailto:rlsolomon@bakerlaw.com">rlsolomon@bakerlaw.com</a>).</p>



<hr class="wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity"/>



<p><a id="_ftn1" href="#_ftnref1">[1]</a> <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/02/13/2026-02965/restoring-integrity-to-the-issuance-of-non-domiciled-commercial-drivers-licenses-cdl" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/02/13/2026-02965/restoring-integrity-to-the-issuance-of-non-domiciled-commercial-drivers-licenses-cdl</a></p>



<p><a id="_ftn2" href="#_ftnref2">[2]</a> <a href="https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/uploads/2026.02.26-Motion-to-Stay.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">https://www.citizen.org/wp-content/uploads/2026.02.26-Motion-to-Stay.pdf</a></p>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeremiah L. Hart, R. Lee Solomon]]></dc:creator>
            <category>Employment</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Proposed DOL Rule Would Simplify Independent Contractor Status – A Little Bit]]></title>
            <link>https://www.employmentlawspotlight.com/blogs/proposed-dol-rule-would-simplify-independent-contractor-status-a-little-bit/</link>
            <guid>https://www.employmentlawspotlight.com/?p=11570</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 05 Mar 2026 14:39:35 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[<p class="RichText_richtext__0_pny align-self-start">A proposed new regulation from the Department of Labor would make it a bit easier to support independent contractor status under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The proposed rule would adopt a five-factor “economic reality” test, consistent with the test adopted during the first Trump administration. The defining feature of this test is that it highlights two core factors. If these two factors are met, the worker would almost always be an independent contractor under the FLSA and FMLA.</p>
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>I was in Italy last week and visited Vatican City. Passport control at the Rome airport was annoyingly slow, but getting in and out of Vatican City – a sovereign nation – was surprisingly easy. Below is a photo of border control at the Vatican.</p>



<p>Navigating the border between independent contractor and employee status is usually more Rome airport than Vatican City, but a proposed new regulation from the Department of Labor (DOL) would make it a bit easier to support independent contractor status under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).</p>



<p>The proposed rule would adopt a five-factor “economic reality” test, consistent with the test adopted during the first Trump administration. The defining feature of this test is that it highlights two core factors. If these two factors are met, the worker would almost always be an independent contractor under the FLSA and FMLA.</p>



<p>Core factor No. 1 is “<strong>The nature and degree of control over the work</strong>.” This factor weighs toward independent contractor status if the individual, not the potential employer, “exercises substantial control over key aspects of the performance of the work, such as by setting his or her own schedule, by selecting his or her projects, and/or through the ability to work for others, which might include the potential employer’s competitors.”</p>



<p>Notably, the proposed rule makes clear that certain types of control are not considered when conducting the analysis: “Requiring the individual to comply with specific legal obligations, satisfy health and safety standards, carry insurance, meet contractually agreed-upon deadlines or quality control standards, or satisfy other similar terms that are typical of contractual relationships between businesses (as opposed to employment relationships) does not constitute control that makes the individual more or less likely to be an employee under the [FLSA].”</p>



<p>Core factor No. 2 is “<strong>The individual’s opportunity for profit or loss</strong>.” This factor weighs toward independent contractor status when “the individual has an opportunity to earn profits or incur losses based on his or her exercise of initiative (such as managerial skill or business acumen or judgment) or management of his or her investment in or capital expenditure on, for example, helpers or equipment or material to further his or her work.”</p>



<p>The three other factors are:</p>



<ul class="wp-block-list">
<li><strong>The amount of skill required for the work. </strong>More highly skilled work suggests contractor status.</li>



<li><strong>The degree of permanence of the working relationship.</strong>Defined projects of limited duration suggest contractor status.</li>



<li><strong>Whether the work is part of an integrated unit of production. </strong>Work that is segregable from the potential employer’s production process suggests contractor status. The importance of the work is not part of this analysis.</li>
</ul>



<p>Additional unspecified factors may also be considered, if relevant. The parties’ actions – not what the contract says – are what matter most.</p>



<p>But how much will this rule really change things? Probably not much.</p>



<p>First, the rule would apply only to two laws – the FLSA and FMLA. Different tests are used for determining whether someone is an employee under federal and state tax laws, employee benefits laws, state wage and hour laws, and state workers’ compensation and unemployment laws.</p>



<p>Second, the rule would likely apply only to DOL proceedings. The courts know how to interpret the FLSA and FMLA and do not need guidance from whatever presidential administration is in power at a given time. The courts are unlikely to grant any deference to the DOL’s regulation.</p>



<p>Third, as of now, this is only a proposed rule. There is a public comment period that runs through April 28. At the end of the comment period, the DOL may issue a final rule. The final rule might differ somewhat from the proposed rule, but probably not by much.</p>



<p>There is one particularly bright spot for employers if this rule is adopted. Under 29 U.S.C. Section 259, an employer has a complete defense to an FLSA claim alleging that it failed to pay minimum wage or overtime if the employer, in good faith, relied upon and acted in conformity with a regulation.</p>



<p>Therefore, if the proposed rule becomes a final rule, companies retaining independent contractors should strongly consider adding text to their independent contractor agreements that indicates reliance on the new regulation. It can also be helpful in the contract to highlight facts that demonstrate conformity with the regulation, such as that the contractor determines his or her schedule, selects projects and may work for others.</p>



<p>For now, companies should continue to monitor the rule. If it passes, try to take advantage of the safe harbor provision in Section 259. But remember, this rule is limited in scope and does not affect a worker’s status under any law other than the FLSA and FMLA. A worker can simultaneously be a contractor under one law and an employee under another.</p>



<p>Even if this rule is eventually adopted, and it likely will be, the final rule will not provide an easy exit from classification challenges. The rule is certainly more like exiting Vatican City than like passing through customs in Rome, but navigating misclassification claims will never be as simple as walking through a gap in the gate.</p>



<p>Arrivederci!</p>



<p>Please contact the author of this blog or your BakerHostetler attorney contact if you have any questions.</p>



<figure class="wp-block-image size-large"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" width="1024" height="538" src="https://admin.employmentlawspotlight.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/03/Border-control-at-the-Vatican-1200x630-1-1024x538.jpg" alt="" class="wp-image-11594" srcset="https://admin.employmentlawspotlight.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/03/Border-control-at-the-Vatican-1200x630-1-1024x538.jpg 1024w, https://admin.employmentlawspotlight.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/03/Border-control-at-the-Vatican-1200x630-1-300x158.jpg 300w, https://admin.employmentlawspotlight.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2026/03/Border-control-at-the-Vatican-1200x630-1.jpg 1200w" sizes="auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px" /></figure>
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            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Todd H. Lebowitz]]></dc:creator>
            <category>Department of Labor</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Your Friendly Nudge: Send the CA “Know Your Rights” Notice by Feb. 1]]></title>
            <link>https://www.employmentlawspotlight.com/blogs/your-friendly-nudge-send-the-ca-know-your-rights-notice-by-feb-1/</link>
            <guid>https://www.employmentlawspotlight.com/?p=11063</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 28 Jan 2026 20:35:25 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[<p>Pursuant to California’s new <a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260SB294" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Workplace Know Your Rights Act (SB 294)</a>, on or before Feb. 1 and annually thereafter, employers must provide to each current employee a stand-alone written notice of employees’ rights when interacting with law enforcement in the workplace. For new employees, the notice must be provided upon hire. The model notice is available <a href="https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/Know-Your-Rights-Notice/Know-Your-Rights-Notice-English.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">here</a>.</p>
]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[
<p>Pursuant to California’s new <a href="https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260SB294" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">Workplace Know Your Rights Act (SB 294)</a>, on or before Feb. 1 and annually thereafter, employers must provide to each current employee a stand-alone written notice of employees’ rights when interacting with law enforcement in the workplace. For new employees, the notice must be provided upon hire. The model notice is available <a href="https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/Know-Your-Rights-Notice/Know-Your-Rights-Notice-English.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener">here</a>.</p>



<p>The notice must be provided in a manner the employer normally uses to communicate employment-related information – e.g., personal service, email, text message – if it can reasonably be anticipated that the notice will be received by the employee within one business day of its being sent. The law also requires employers, upon an employee’s request, to notify the employee’s designated emergency contact in the event the employee is arrested or detained at work. Employers must provide current employees the opportunity to designate this emergency contact no later than March 30.</p>



<p>Please contact any member of the BakerHostetler Labor and Employment Practice Group with any questions.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
            <dc:creator><![CDATA[Sabrina L. Shadi, Shareef Farag]]></dc:creator>
            <category>California</category>
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